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A Power Shift in Public School Management
I. Introduction
The Public Employe Relations Act of 1970 (Act 195),1 which
mandated collective bargaining between teachers and school boards,
significantly diminished the powers of Pennsylvania school boards.
The expansion of bilateral decision-making in public education and
the concomitant limitation of unilateral management by school boards
have come not solely as a result of Act 195, but more significantly as
a result of court and Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB)
2
decisions. The purpose of this comment is to examine this expansion
of bilateral decision-making since 1970 and its consequences.
To understand the extent and ramifications of this power shift, it
is necessary to review the management powers of school boards prior
to Act 195. Although a school board's authority to manage tradi-
tionally has been subject to certain limitations,3 those imposed by Act
195 are of a different nature. In the past only two limitations were
placed on a board's authority. First, the general assembly has plen-
ary power to control education;4 therefore school boards have only
that authority explicitly delegated by the legislature.5 Second, the
Public School Code6 mandates certain statewide educational policies.
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101-.2301 (Supp. 1976) (enacted as Act of
July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, No. 195) [hereinafter referred to in text as Act 1951.
2. This agency was created by the Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, No. 195, §
501-03 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.501-.503 (Supp. 1976)).
3. The State Board of Education has concurrent jurisdiction with local school
boards. Each local board has authority and discretion to manage the day-to-day
operations of its schools subject to broad principles set forth by the State Board. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §9 118.1, 367, 369 (Supp. 1976). The local school board in some
instances is also responsible to the Department of Education. Id. § 352, 353, 368.
4. The Pennsylvania constitution states, "The General Assembly shall provide
for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public
education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth." PA. CONST. art. 1H, § 14.
5. This strict construction was articulated by John Dillon and became known
as the Dillon Rule:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corpo-
ration possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others: First,
those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied
in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the
accomplishment, of the declared objects and puroses of the corporation,-
not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial
doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against
the corporation, and the power is denied.
J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 1911).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 1-101 to 27-2702 (1962 & Supp. 1976).
If in the past the exercise of authority fell within these limitations, the
courts granted school boards the discretion to act unilaterally. Within
its district a school board exercised broad decision-making power to
shape educational policies and quality.7
The courts refused to place limitations upon this power unless a
school board's decision was based on "a misconception of law, igno-
rance through lack of inquiry into the facts necessary to form intelli-
gent judgment, or the result of arbitrary will or caprice." The
informed decisions of school boards were presumed to be in the best
interests of education and of the public because of the school direc-
tors' "knowledge of the administration of business, finance, or the
science of pedagogics." 9  Even though the only statutory qualifica-
tions are that directors have good moral character, be twenty-one
years of age, and reside in the district for at least one year prior to
election, 10 school directors were treated as trained educators and
administrators. Prior to the passage of Act 195 in 1970 the courts
and the legislature expressed the belief that the school boards' uni-
lateral decision-making power effectively guaranteed the quality of
public education.
Act 195, on the other hand, was a legislative recognition that
management's unilateral decision-making in the area of employer-
employee relations had led to "an almost complete breakdown in
communications between management and labor."" The declared
purpose of the Act was "to promote orderly and constructive relation-
ships between all public employers and their employees."12  The
belief that harmonious employer-employee relations furthered the
public's interest in the effective operation of public employment
replaced the public policy that unilateral management served the
public best.'"
As a result of the public policy embodied in Act 195, a new
limitation was placed on school boards' power. The courts no longer
7. State College Educ. Ass'n v. PLRB, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 229, 244, 306
A.2d 404, 413 (1973).
8. Smith v. Darby School Dist., 388 Pa. 301, 130 A.2d 661 (1957).
9. Id.
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 3-322 (Supp. 1976).
11. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION To REVISE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYE LAW OF PENN-
SYLVANIA, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (1968). The Hickman Commission
appointed by Governor Shafer reviewed public employer-employee relations and
concluded that the Public Employe Act of 1947 should be repealed. The Commission
found three major weaknesses in the Act's structure. First, it did not require public
employers to bargain collectively with their employees. Second, the Act banned all
strikes. Third, the mandatory penalties of the Act were self-defeating. The Hick-
man Commission felt that new legislation was needed to correct the inequities that
had led to labor unrest. Id. at 6-8.
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Supp. 1976).




presumed that if a board had the power to act, it could act independ-
ently.14  The school board's duty to negotiate with teachers"5 man-
dated bilateral decision-making. Its power to make decisions affect-
ing employer-employee relations was now limited by the teachers'
power to reject those decisions.
The decisions of the courts and the PLRB interpreting Act 195
have dealt primarily with the three sections that define the scope of
bargaining. Section 701,16 which mandates bargaining, has been
construed by the courts to include a constantly expanding list of
bargainable items.' 7 Section 702,18 which imposes a meet-and-dis-
cuss requirement on certain negotiations, has been strictly con-
strued. 19 Section 703,20 which nullifies provisions in collective bar-
gaining agreements that are contrary to law, also has been strictly
construed to preserve teachers' powers to bargain.2' Thus, through
strict construction of the limiting sections and broad construction of
the mandatory bargaining section, the courts have expanded the scope
of bargaining between teachers and school boards.
Binding arbitration is required by section 90322 in disputes
arising out of collective bargaining agreements 2' This section has
been extended by the courts to permit arbitrators to make judgments
once made exclusively by school boards.24 The new division of
power between school boards, teachers, and arbitrators has indirectly
revised the School Code and, perhaps, the quality of education in
Pennsylvania.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 503, 337 A.2d at 266.
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.701 (Supp. 1976).
17. Compare State College Educ. Ass'n v. PLRB with Milberry v. Board of
Educ., - Pa. -, 354 A.2d 559 (1976); Board of Educ. v. Local 3, Fed'n of
Teachers, - Pa. -, 346 A.2d 35 (1975), and PLRB v. State College Area School
Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975).
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.702 (Supp. 1976).
19. The meet-and-discuss requirement is analogous to permissive bargaining in
the private sector. A general discussion of the mandatory, permissive, and nonbar-
gainable divisions can be found in Edwards, The Emerging Duty To Bargain in the
Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REV. 885 (1973).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.703 (Supp. 1976).
21. See notes 97-148 and accompanying text infra.
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Supp. 1976).
23. See notes 149-50 and accompanying text infra.
24. Milberry v. Board of Educ., - Pa. -, 354 A.2d 559 (1976); Board
of Educ. v. Local 3, Phila. Fed'n of Teachers, - Pa. -, 346 A.2d 35 (1975); PLRB
v. Oxford Bd. of School Dir'rs, 7 Pa. Public Employee Reports 19 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as P.P.E.R.I.
II. The Scope of Bargaining-Its Effect on School Boards' Powers
Sections 701, 702, and 703 of Act 195 delineate the scope of
bargaining in public employment and, thus, affect the scope of a
school board's management powers. The lack of clarity concerning
the interrelation of these three sections and the breadth of their
language z5 encourages judicial legislation. In interpreting these sec-
tions the courts have entertained several considerations in addition to
the statutory language. First, they recognize that the distinctive
characteristics of government operations present special problems in
labor negotiations26 that preclude reliance on decisions made in the
private sector.27  Second, to interpret section 703 and determine its
relationship to sections 701 and 702 in teacher negotiations, the
courts must interpret the School Code.2" Last, a court's decision is
often influenced by its recognition that teachers are professional
employees who see educational policy decisions as conditions of
employment.29 By juggling these elements the courts have either
25. Section 701 refers to "other terms and conditions of employment." Section
702 uses the phrase "matters of inherent managerial policy." Section 703 prohibits
an agreement "inconsistent with" the law. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.701-.703
(Supp. 1976).
26. Impasses in labor negotiations present special problems in state and
local government because of certain distinctive characteristcs of govern-
ment operations:
1. Such government processes as elections, referenda, legislation, and
court decisions are themselves means for settling disputes and conflicts of
interest.
2. Three branches of government, as well as voters, share government
powers; therefore, employer authority is often divided, overlapping and
somewhat ambiguous.
3. Decisions on public expenditures are subject to certain procedures
and constraints, including approval by the legislature and vote of approval
by the electorate in the case of some school district budgets, thus raising
questions of budget authority.
4. Governments have sovereign powers, which include the power to
compel compliance with laws and court decisions, as well as, the power to
levy taxes, subject to approval under democratic processes and written con-
stitutions.
5. Voters have a direct interest in the results of collective bargaining,
both as consumers of public services and as taxpayers.
6. For many services, government is a monopolistic supplier so that
economic pressure of loss of customers, loss of employment, and loss of
profits cannot be relied upon to induce negotiated settlements.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY PUBLIC EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS STUDY COMMISSION,
REPORT TO GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 23-25 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NEW
JERSEY COMM'N]. A general discussion of this topic. is provided by J. WEITZMAN,
THE SCOPE OF BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 3-15, 72-8 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as WErrMAN]; Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargaining in
Public Employment, 79 YALE L.J. 805, 857-70 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Welling-
ton & Winter].
27. Board of Educ. v. Local 3, Phila. Fed'n of Teachers, - Pa. -, -, 346
A.2d 35, 39 (1975); PLRB v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, -, 337
A.2d 262, 264-65 (1975); PLRB v. Mars Area School Dist., 21 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 230, 234, 344 A.2d 284, 286 (1975). Contra, PLRB v. McKeesport Area School
Dist., 6 P.P.E.R. 153, 155 (1975). Courts tend to analogize to the private sector
only to support conclusions they have already reached.
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 1-101 to 27-2703 (1962 & Supp. 1976).
29. WEIIXMAN, supra note 26, at 87; Wellington & Winter, supra note 26, at
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narrowly defined the scope of bargaining to preserve school board
powers ° or have made previously unilateral decisions subject to
bargaining- s The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in PLRB v. State
College Area School District,32 Board of Education v. Local 3, Phila-
delphia Federation of Teachers,3 and Milberry v. Board of Educa-
tion3 4 adopted an expansive interpretation of sections 701, 702, and
703, that enlarged the scope of teacher-school board bargaining and,
limited the boards' control over educational policy.
A. Section 701-Bargainable Items
Section 701 mandates that school boards negotiate with teachers'
unions in three areas:
Collective bargaining is the performance of the mutual obli-
gation of the public employer and the representative of the pub-
lic employes to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement or any question
arising thereunder and the execution of a written contract incor-
porating any agreement reached but such obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making
of a concession.3 5
Two major problems confront courts in interpreting this language.
First, the failure of section 701 to define with specificity the phrase
"terms and conditions" leaves the scope of mandatory negotiations to
be defined by the parties or the courts.36 Second, before a court can
interpret section 701, it must determine to what extent section 7023
affects mandatory negotiations under section 701. For example, it is
unclear which section controls when a bilateral determination of wage
rates conflicts with managerial policy.
The supreme court's difficulty in defining "terms and condi-
tions" was remedied by adoption of a test enunciated in a Kansas
852-55; Wollett, The Coming Revolution in Public School Management, 67 MicH. L
REV. 1017 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Wollett].
30. State College Educ. Ass'n v. PLRB, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 229, 306
A.2d 404 (1973).
31. Milberry v. Board of Educ., - Pa. -, 354 A.2d 559 (1976); Board
of Educ. v. Local 3, Phila. Fed'n of Teachers, - Pa. -, 346 A.2d 35 (1975); PLRB
v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975).
32. 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975).
33. - Pa.-, 346 A.2d 35 (1975).
34. - Pa.-, 354 A.2d 559 (1976).
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.701 (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
36., NEw JiERSEY COMM'N, supra note 26, at 47.
37. Section 702 establishes the areas of inherent managerial policy that fall
outside the mandatory negotiations of § 701. See note 51 and accompanying text
infra.
decision. In National Education Association of Shawnee Mission,
Inc. v. Board of Education3" the Supreme Court of Kansas attempted
to clarify the phrase "terms and conditions of professional service. '' 9
Widely disparate interpretations were presented to the court: "[T]he
Board took the position that virtually nothing was negotiable,
while NEA claimed that everything was."40  A compromise be-
tween these divergent positions was sought by examining the stat-
ute's legislative history. The Kansas Legislature had rejected the
phrase "matters of mutual concern."41 Likewise, it did not pass a bill
that limited the scope of collective bargaining to "only wages, hours,
and other economic conditions of employment. '4 2  Therefore, the
court concluded that the statute was meant to go beyond primarily
economic subjects: "The key, as we see it, is how direct the impact
of an issue is on the well-being of the individual teacher, as opposed
to its effect on the operation of the school system as a whole. 43 The
Kansas court decided that the phrase "terms and conditions of pro-
fessional service" included all noneconomic subjects having a direct
impact on a teacher's well-being.
Submission of noneconomic subjects to collective bargaining
directly affects public school management and clearly erodes school
boards' traditionally broad management powers.44 Three subjects
that impact on both teachers' working conditions and a school board's
educational policy-making are class size, 45 student discipline, 46 and
38. 212 Kan. 741, 512 P.2d 426 (1973).
39. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5414 (1972).
Professional employees shall have the right to form, join or assist profes-
sional employees' organizations, to participate in professional negotiation
with boards of education through representatives of their own choosing for
the purpose of establishing, maintaining, protecting or improving terms and
conditions of professional service.
40. 212 Kan. at 743, 512 P.2d at 429.
41. Id. at 752, 512 P.2d at 435. The legislature did not pass Senate bill 218,
which was introduced in 1969. By removing the words "matters of mutual concern,"
the legislature eliminated from bargaining such items as curriculum and materials,
payroll mechanics, certification, class size and the use of paraprofessionals, the use
and duties of substitute teachers, and teachers' ethics and academic freedom. Id. at
751, 512 P.2d at 434-35.
42. Id. In House bill 1562 this phrase was defined to mean "salaries and
wages; hours and the amounts of work; vacation allowances; holidays; retirement;
insurance benefits; wearing apparel; pay for overtime; jury duty, pay and grievance
procedures." Id. at 752, 512 P.2d at 435.
43. Id. at 753, 512 P.2d at 435.
44. Wellington & Winter, supra note 26; Wollett, supra note 29. These
commentators discussed the educational implications of submitting noneconomic
issues to bargaining.
45. A general discussion of whether class size is negotiable can be found in the
following authorities: West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 295
A.2d 526 (1972); National Educ. Ass'n of Shawnee Mission, Inc. v. Board of Educ.,
212 Kan. 741, 752, 512 P.2d 426, 435 (1973); Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen
Educ. Ass'n, 64 N.J. 17, 311 A.2d 737 (1973); Board of Educ. v. Englewood
Teachers Ass'n, 64 N.J. 1, 311 A.2d 729 (1973); Board of Educ. v. Local 1788,
Greenburg Teachers Fed'n, 90 L.R.R.M. 3097 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1975); Wellington &
Winter, supra note 26; Wollett, supra note 29.
46. A general discussion of whether student discipline is a negotiable item can
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curriculum reform.47  All three have been included in collective
bargaining agreements.48 Evaluation and promotion policies also
have been subjects of collective bargaining.4 9 By embracing the
Kansas impact test,50 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has inter-
preted the statutory phrase "terms and conditions" broadly and thus
has made noneconomic items bargainable under section 701.
B. Section 702-Management Rights
Section 702 defines those matters that are subjects of permissive
bargaining.
Public employers shall not be required to bargain over mat-
ters of inherent managerial policy, which shall include but not
be limited to such areas of discretion or policy as the functions
and programs of the public employer, standards of services, its
overall budget, utilization of technology, the organizational
structure and selection and direction of personnel. Public em-
ployers, however, shall be required to meet and discuss on policy
matters affecting wages, hours, and terms and conditions of em-
ployment as well as the impact thereon upon request by public
employee representatives. 5 '
This section can be interpreted to allow severe limitation of employ-
ees' rights to bargain under section 701 and to expand the subjects
upon which management can make unilateral decisions. Alternative-
ly, by properly balancing sections 701 and 702, the inherent rights of
management can be limited to promote the goal of meaningful bar-
gaining. The trend in recent Pennsylvania decisions has been to
adopt the second alternative. In so doing, the courts and the PLRB
under some circumstances have required bargaining on subjects that
be found in National Educ. Ass'n of Shawnee Mission, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 212
Kan. 741, 752, 512 P.2d 426, 434 (1973); Wellington & Winter, supra note 26;
Wollett, supra note 29. In the Pittsburgh contract settlement the teachers failed to
have corporal punishment reinstated. The board of education, however, promised to
take another vote on the issue. The board also plans to rewrite the student discipline
code, this time with teacher input. Education Daily, Jan. 28, 1976, at 1.
47. Wellington & Winter, supra note 26; Wollett, supra note 29.
48. Wellington & Winter, supra note 26; Wollett, supra note 29.
49. Milberry v. Board of Educ., - Pa. -, 354 A.2d 559 (1976); Belanger v.
Matteson, - R.I. -, 346 A.2d 124 (1975).
50. PLRB v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 559, 337 A.2d 262,
268 (1975).
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.702 (Supp. 1976).
affect wages, hours, terms, and conditions of employment even
though these subjects also affect policy matters.
5 2
1. Balancing Sections 701 and 702.-The breadth of section
702 depends upon whether it prevails when a subject of mandatory
bargaining under section 701 is also a matter of inherent managerial
policy. In State College Education Association v. PLRB5 3 the com-
monwealth court held that section 702 governs this situation, stating
that
the controlling provision, not to be overlooked, is that under Sec-
tion 702 a public employer is not required to bargain on any
policy matter notwithstanding the effect or impact that it may
have on wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employ-
ment.54
This construction of section 702 preserves school board control of
policy matters through the power to make unilateral policy decisions.
To safeguard this power the commonwealth court proposed several
rules of statutory construction. The subjects enumerated in section
701 were labeled "words of limitation"55 that represent the limited
category of issues on which a public employer is required to bargain.
Consequently, the court stressed the necessity of strictly construing
the section 701 phrase "wages, hours, and terms and conditions of
employment."56  As a complement to its strict construction of sec-
tion 701, the court developed a broad definition of managerial policy
under section 702.5 7 In this manner the commonwealth court ex-
pressed its intent to prevent erosion of the broad authority granted to
school boards by the School Code.58
This decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvan-
52. Board of Educ. v. Local 3, Phila. Fed'n of Teachers, - Pa. -, 346 A.2d 35
(1975) (dismissal of nontenured teacher); PLRB v. State College Area School Dist.,
461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975); Canon-McMillan School Bd. v. Commonwealth,
12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 323, 316 A.2d 114 (1974) (wages for extracurricular
activities); PLRB v. Oxford Bd. of School Dir'rs, 7 P.P.E.R. 19 (1976) (ratings);
PLRB v. McKeesport Area School Dist., 6 P.P.E.R. 153 (1975) (subcontracting
services).
53. 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 229, 306 A.2d 404 (1975).
54. Id. at 238, 306 A.2d at 410.
55. Id. at 242, 306 A.2d at 412.
56. Id. Wages were defined as the remuneration one will receive. The
concept of hours was said to encompass the total number of hours, the period of time
to be covered, starting time, ending time, and rest periods. The subject of whether a
teacher should be present at parent-teacher meetings was determined to be a policy
matter affecting hours. The court also listed subjects that are included in the phrase
"terms and conditions": physical conditions, quantity and quality of work required,
safety practices, sickness and hospital benefits, and vacation benefits.
57. Id. The court defined matters of inherent managerial policy as
such matters that belong to the public employer as natural prerogative or
essential element of the right (1) to manage the affairs of its business, oper-
ation or activity and (2) to make decisions that determine the policy and
direction that the business operation or activity shall pursue.
58. Id. at 244, 306 A.2d at 412.
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ia,59 which held that the commonwealth court's interpretation of the
interplay of sections 701 and 702 was so restrictive that it emasculat-
ed section 701 and thwarted the legislative policy behind Act 195.60
In its stead the supreme court enunciated a test of bargainability:
[W]here an item of dispute is a matter of fundamental concern
to the employes' interest in wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment, it is not removed as a matter subject
to good faith bargaining under section 701 simply because it
may touch upon basic policy. It is the duty of the Board in
the first instance and the courts thereafter to determine whether
the impact of the issue on the interest of the employe in wages,
hours and terms and conditions of employment outweighs its
probable effect on the basic policy of the system as a whole.61
A two-pronged determination is required. First, the impact of the
failure to negotiate on the public employees' interest in wages, hours,
and working condition must be examined. Second, the State College
test requires a determination of whether this impact on the employees'
interest outweighs its probable effect on the basic policy of the school
system.
2. Impact of the State College Test on Management Rights.-
The State College test expands the scope of bargaining under section
701 and reduces management's exclusive rights under section 702.
Its language is sufficiently broad, however, to permit a court to exer-
cise its discretion in deciding what authority is statutorily vested in
the school boards. A court, therefore, can limit the scope of collective
bargaining while paying lip service to the State College test.
Two examples of such limitation under the State College test are
Borough of Wilkinsburg v. Sanitation Department 2 and PLRB v.
Mars Area School District.6" Both cases involved replacement of a
group of public employees6 4 with lower-paid substitutes. 65 In both
cases the commonwealth court found no violation of the duty to
59. PLRB v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262
(1975), rev'g 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 229, 306 A.2d 404 (1973).
60. PLRB v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262, 267
(1975).
61. Id. at -, 337 A.2d at 268 (adopting Kansas test).
62. 16 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 640, 330 A.2d 306 (1975).
63. 21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 230, 344 A.2d 284 (1975).
64. In Wilkinsburg the borough was subcontracting rubbish collection work
previously performed by the bargaining unit members. In Mars the school district
terminated eleven teachers' aides whose wages, hours, and terms and conditions of
employment had been included in the executed collective bargaining agreement.
65. In Wilkinsburg a private contractor was less expensive. In Mars the work
was divided among volunteer teachers' aides and teachers.
bargain when (1) the decision was made to effect economic savings,
(2) the employer eliminated the jobs in good faith after careful
consideration, and (3) a budgetary decision involved matters of
inherent managerial policy.06 Wilkinsburg was decided prior to State
College,67 but when the Mars decision was handed down, the State
College test was available.68  Although the court quoted the test in
the Mars decision, conspicuously absent from the opinion was any
consideration of the impact of the budgetary issue on the employee's
interests in working conditions. The commonwealth court, despite
State College, preserved the powers of the school board at the ex-
pense of collective bargaining.
Using the same test the PLRB reached a contrary result 69 on
similar facts70 in PLRB v. McKeesport Area School District.71 The
Board found a mandatory duty to bargain under section 701 when
the school board sought to subcontract its bus service. 72  Relying
upon Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 73 the PLRB distin-
guished the commonwealth court's holding that budgetary considera-
tions are matters of inherent managerial policy.74 While recognizing
that the school board's decision was meant to save substantial funds,
the PLRB concluded that the school directors should provide existing
employees with an opportunity to negotiate a mutually acceptable
alternative to achieve similar savings 75 despite the decision's impact
upon the overall budget. Bargaining under section 701, rather than
meeting and discussing under section 702,76 was ordered.77  By
limiting a school board's ability to avoid negotiations by invoking
section 702, the PLRB and the supreme court have ensured that
certain educational policy decisions that in the past were made unilat-
erally will now be made at the bargaining table.
3. Expansion of the Duty To Meet and Discuss.-The PLRB
also has expanded the scope of negotiations by its interpretation of
66. PLRB v. Mars Area School Dist., 21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 230, 235, 344
A.2d 284, 287 (1975). Borough of Wilkinsburg v. Sanitation Dep't, 16 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 640, 657, 330 A.2d 306, 309 (1975).
67. Wilkinsburg was decided in January 1975; State College was not decided
until April 1975.
68. Mars was decided in September 1975.
69. The PLRB held that State College had reversed Wilkinsburg. PLRB v.
McKeesport Area School Dist., 6 P.P.E.R. 153, 155 (1975).
70. The school district had decided to sell its bus fleet and contract with a
private firm for bus service without negotiating with its bus drivers.
71. 6 P.P.E.R. 153, 155 (1975).
72. Id. at 155.
73. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
74. PLRB v. McKeesport Area School Dist., 6 P.P.E.R. 153, 155 (1975).
75. Id.
76. Contra, PLRB v. Mars Area School Dist., 21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 230,
344 A.2d 284 (1975); Borough of Wilkinsburg v. Sanitation Dep't, 16 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 640, 330 A.2d 306 (1975).
77. PLRB v. McKeesport Area School Dist., 6 P.P.E.R. 153, 155 (1975).
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the permissive bargaining defined in section 702. In PLRB v. Wil-
liamsport Education Association"' the Board stressed that section 702
does not prohibit bargaining on matters of inherent managerial pol-
icy.79 Instead, the section simply states that the public employer
"shall not be required to bargain. '80 By introducing permissive bar-
gaining subjects at the bargaining table, the public employee is not
guilty of an unfair labor practice.8 ' Although the employee repre-
sentative cannot bargain directly on managerial policy issues, he can
attempt to persuade the public employer to bargain on one or more
permissive subjects in exchange for a concession on mandatory
items."2
The negotiability of permissive items was further expanded in
PLRB v. Dallastown Area Education Association.8 3 In this case the
Board held that a union can demand that decisions normally made by
management be negotiated.
8 4
The union did not violate Sections 701 and 702 of the Act
by insisting on unassigned preparation time and teaching load
being bargaining topics, notwithstanding the school board's claim
that the union has attempted to coerce them into negotiating by
refusing to continue meaningful negotiations unless the school
board concedes to the union matters of inherent managerial pol-
icy, since the disputed issues are permissible items for bargain-
ing.85
This conclusion effectively nullifies the restraints placed upon public
employee bargaining rights by section 702. The distinction between
mandatory and permissive subjects of negotiation becomes meaning-
less if the employees' union can coerce bargaining on matters of
inherent managerial policy.
4. Management's Power To Make Unilateral Decisions-A
Further Restriction.-The legislature's attempt to narrow the defini-
tion of inherent managerial policy by setting forth a nonexclusive
list 8 in section 702 has proved ineffective. An expansive construc-
78. 6 P.P.E.R. 57 (1975).




83. 7 P.P.E.R. 1 (1976).
84. Id. at 3.
85. Id. at 1-2.
86. That list includes "functions and programs of the public employer, stan-
dards of services, its overall budget, utilization of technology, the organizational
structure and selection and direction of personnel." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §
1101.702 (Supp. 1976).
tion of the enumerated policy issues, typified by an early decision,
can limit the scope of bargaining to very few subjects.8 7 In 1971 a
commentator on Act 195 accurately predicted the difficulty the
broad language of section 702 would cause.""
In more recent decisions the courts have disregarded the subjects
enumerated in section 702.9 In Board of Education v. Local 3,
Philadelphia Federation of Teachers" the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania held that a school district can agree in a collective bargaining
agreement to submit to arbitration the propriety of discharging a
nontenured teacher. The collective bargaining agreement in that
case provided the following exclusion from the mandatory grievance
procedure:
The parties recognize that the Board of Education has uni-
lateral authority in the field of educational policy and develop-
ment. This Agreement is not intended to modify by any of its
terms any discretionary authority concerning such matters vested
in the Board by the statutes of the Commonwealth or the Home
Rule Charter.91
Despite this contractual language the school board did not contend
that its authority to dismiss teachers fell under the "selection and
direction of personnel" phrase of section 702, which is specifically
designated as an inherent managerial policy matter.92 In a similar
case the supreme court rejected the contention that the rating of a,
professional employee involved the selection and direction of person-
nel.9" In neither case did the court hold that selection and direction
of personnel is a managerial duty incapable of delegation to an
arbitrator.
The courts that have examined the relationship between sections
701 and 702 have expanded the scope of collective bargaining. First,
teachers' unions have gained the right to bargain about issues influ-
encing educational policy if there is a greater impact on teaching
conditions than on policy.94 Second, they now have the right to use a
mandatory bargaining subject as a wedge or trade-off to negotiate
about permissive items.95 Finally, a teachers' organization has the
87. State College Educ. Ass'n v. PLRB, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 229, 306
A.2d 404 (1973).
88. Comment, The Public Employe Relations Act and Pennsylvania Teachers:
A Legal Analysis in Light of the January, 1971 Pittsburgh Dispute, 10 DUQUESNE L.
RFv. 77 (1971).
89. See note 198 and accompanying text infra.
90. - Pa. -, 346 A.2d 35 (1975).
91. Id. at - n.5, 346 A.2d at 37 n.5.
92. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.702 (Supp. 1976).
93. Milberry v. Board of Educ., - Pa. -, 354 A.2d 559 (1976).
94. PLRB v. State College Area Schol Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 507, 337 A.2d 262,
268 (1975).
95. PLRB v. Wiliamsport 'Educ. Ass'n, 6 P.P.E.R. 57 (1975).
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right to monitor a school board's interpretation of a managerial policy
provision through an impartial arbitrator. 6
C. Section 703-Violation of Existing Statutes
PLRB v. State College Area School District 7 and Board of
Education v. Local 3, Philadelphia Federation of Teachers 8 not only
have decreased the impact of section 702, but also have minimized
the use of section 703, which prohibits agreements contrary to exist-
ing law, as a deterrent to collective bargaining. Section 703 provides,
The parties to the collective bargaining process shall not ef-
fect or implement a provision in a collective bargaining agree-
ment if the implementation of that provision would be in viola-
tion of, or inconsistent with, or in conflict with any statute or
statutes enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania or the provisions of municipal home rule char-
ters.9 9
In State College and Philadelphia Federation of Teachers the su-
preme court developed four principles for interpreting section 703 to
expand the scope of negotiations.
1 . Existence of Coextensive Legislation.-The first principle
is that the existence of legislation dealing with a subject does not pro-
hibit bargaining on a related issue.'00 Enunciation of this principle
overruled two commonwealth court decisions, the first of which held
that section 703 prohibits bargaining on duties and responsibilities
imposed on public employers by statute.' Under this interpretation
any duties and prerogatives imposed upon or granted to school boards
by the School Code would be immune from bargaining. Because of
the broad grants of power to make rules and regulations related to
employees' and students' conduct and to educate every person of
school age, the commonwealth court's prohibition could have been
used to strangle virtually all attempts at collective bargaining.
Another commonwealth court decision sought to restrain bar-
gaining by stating that section 703 requires a clear legislative declara-
96. Board of Educ. v. Local 3, Phila. Fed'n of Teachers, - Pa. -, 346 A.2d 35
(1975).
97. 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975).
98. - Pa. -, 346 A.2d 35 (1975).
99. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.703 (Supp. 1976).
100. PLRB v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 508, 337 A.2d 262,
269 (1975).
101. State College Educ. Ass'n v. PLRB, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 229, 244, 306
A.2d 404, 413 (1973).
tion to support any departure from a school board's traditional role of
operating and managing the public schools.'0 -  Thus, the court
placed upon the teachers' association the burden of showing specific
statutory authorization for any variation from the statutory scheme.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected both of these restrictions
on collective bargaining by holding that mere coverage of a subject by
legislation does not remove it from collective bargaining."°3
2. Minimum Duties.-The second principle enunciated by the
supreme court is that a statute that sets forth minimum duties or
responsibilities of the school board is not inconsistent with a collective
bargaining agreement provision that goes beyond the prescribed mini-
mum. 10 4  For example, a school board can agree to pay higher
salaries than those prescribed in the School Code1°5 and to provide
procedural safeguards in a dismissal proceeding that exceed the due
process requirements of the Code.' 6 In Board of Education v. Local
3, Philadelphia Federation of Teachers'07 the supreme court extended
application of the minimum duties principle by analogizing the mini-
mum salary example to the due process requirements for dismissing a
nontenured teacher. The School Code explicitly states that the
prescribed salaries are minimums'0 8 that school boards have authority
to exceed. 09 On the other hand, no statement concerning minimum
due process requirements or power to alter them is made in the
relevant provisions of either the School Code 10 or the Local Agency
Law.
I '
The significance of this departure from the explicit statutory
language was pointed out in PLRB v. Richland School District."'
The [Public School] Code does not presume ,to lay out concrete
limits and ceilings to the powers and duties of these boards.
Rather, it defines minimums which must be given to teachers.
Before the passage of Act 195 all school teachers in the Com-
monwealth had to depend on were statutory provisions in the
Code which set up basic levels for wages and other benefits.
Now, under Act 195, the Code is interpreted to set up only
minimums, the upper limits of what boards may give teachers
102. Id.




106. Milberry v. Board of Educ., - Pa. -, 354 A.2d 559 (1976); Board of
Educ. v. Local 3, Phila. Fed'n of Teachers, - Pa. -, 346 A.2d 35 (1975).
107. - Pa. -, 354 A.2d 559 (1976).
108. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1142 (Supp. 1976).
109. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1152 (Supp. 1976).
110. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5-508, 5-514 (Supp. 1976).
111. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 11301-311 (1962).
112. 2 P.P.E.R. 195 (1972). This decision was overruled insofar as it held si~k
leave was a mandatorily bargainable item. PLRB v. Richland School District, 4
P.P.E.R. 2, 4 (1974),
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are subject only to bargaining between the parties. Thus the
school district here cannot hide behind the statute books and at-
tempt to avoid its duties to bargain, since the statute books pro-
vide, not refuse, but additional duties.
1
3
The same argument was used by the appellee in Milberry v. Board of
Education"4 to support the contention that sections 1123, 1124, and
1125 of the School Code" 5 allow only minimal protection against
improper rating of a teacher.1 6 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
agreed that review of the propriety of an unsatisfactory rating by an
arbitrator merely accords the teacher further procedural protection.Y 7
Extension of this second principle not only expands the scope of
bargaining, but also permits parties to an agreement to legislate
changes in the School Code within their school district. Issues that
school boards could once resolve merely by resorting to the School
Code are now subject to bargaining.1"8 This power to go beyond the
minimal standards of the School Code becomes particularly signifi-
cant when a school board is authorized to spend additional funds. To
avoid potential budget balancing problems caused by additional ex-
penditures, school boards have sought to limit their own discretionary
authority.
3. Discretionary Authority.-In PLRB v. State College Area
School District'" the supreme court held that a school board's discre-
tionary authority can be exercised to implement a collective bar-
gaining agreement. 120  This third principle requires determination
of whether a specific statute limits a school board's authority. One
line of interpretation holds that a school board's discretion is denied
or limited by a detailed expression of legislative intent.1 2 ' The attor-
113. PLRB v. Richland School District, 2 P.P.E.R. 195, 196 (1972).
114. Brief for Appellee at 9, Milberry v. Board of Educ., - Pa. -, 354 A.2d
559 (1976).
115. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 11-1123-25 (Supp. 1976).
116. Brief for Appellee at 9, Milberry v. Board of Educ., - Pa. -, 354 A.2d
559 (1976). Appellee contended that the minimum protection that the School
Code mandates is indirect when the propriety for a rating is determined at the
dismissal proceedings. Therefore, it is not inconsistent with the Public School Code
to bargain for a direct review of the rating through binding arbitration.
117. Milberry v. Board of Educ., - Pa. -, 354 A.2d 559 (1976).
118. Id. (rating of a tenured teacher); Board of Educ. v. Local 3, Phila. Fed'n
of Teachers, - Pa. -, 346 A.2d 35 (1975) (dismissal of nontenured teacher).
119. 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975).
120. PLRB v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 509, 337 A.2d 262,
269 (1975).
121. For example, the Attorney General has advised the Secretary of Education
that statutory provisions concerning sabbatical leave are quite specific and, therefore,
ney general has concluded that because the School Code sets forth
detailed requirements for granting sabbatical leave and associated
benefits,122 no negotiated modification is permissible.' 23  Further-
more, the attorney general has declared124 that school boards possess
discretion to bargain only when specifically authorized by statute. 125
Following this line of reasoning, seventy-five school districts
have been cited by the auditor general for making improper payments
to retiring teachers. 126  These districts agreed in their collective bar-
gaining agreements to pay their teachers a certain percentage of any
unused sick leave upon retirement. The auditor general has conclud-
ed that school boards have no authority to make this concession2 7
because their discretion is limited by section 1154(a) of the School
Code, 28 which requires the recipient of sick leave payments to be
sick and to be employed by the school district. The statute is deemed
to limit, therefore, a school board's discretion and authority to bar-
gain on matters related to extension of leave or authorization of leave
with pay for other purposes.'
29
limit a school board's authority to bargain for modifications. 1973 OPINIONS OF
ATr'Y GEN. No. 31 at 74. Although an Attorney General's Opinion is not binding,
the supreme court has said that it is entitled to great weight. McDowell v. Good
Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., 397 Pa. 237, 154 A.2d 497 (1959).
122. (1) To qualify for sabbatical leave, an employe must complete ten years of
satisfactory service in the public school system of the Commonwealth. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1166 (Supp. 1976); (2) Subsequent to the granting of the first
sabbatical leave, one sabbatical leave of absence "shall be allowed after each seven
years of service." Id.; (3) To qualify for sabbatical leave, a person must agree "to
return to his or her employment with the school district for a period of not less than
one school term immediately following such leave of absence." Id. § 11-1168; (4) A
person on sabbatical leave "shall receive one-half of his or her regular salary" while
on sabbatical leave. Id. § 11-1169, and (5) Applications for sabbatical leave "shall
be given preference according to years of service since the previous sabbatical leave of
applicant." Id. § 11-1167.
123. 1973 OPINIONS OF A'r'y GEN. No. 31 at 76.
124. 1973 OPINIONS OF A-r'y GEN. No. 31 at 77.
125. The school board has the power to: (1) grant sabbatical leave for purposes
other than those specified. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1166 (Supp. 1976); (2)
waive the requirement of five years consecutive service in the local school district. Id.;
(3) extend the sabbatical leave up to one full term when the employe becomes ill
while on leave. Id.; (4) make regulations governing the granting of leave. Id. § 11-
1167; (5) require compliance with terms of leave. Id. § 1171; and (6) waive the
requirement that the employee must return to service. Id. § 11-1168.
126. Interview with Craig R. Burgraff, Deputy Counsel, Office of the Auditor
Gen., March 12, 1976. These citations have been made from January 1, through
June 1, 1976.
127. Legal memorandum from Craig R. Burgraff, Deputy Counsel, Office of the
Auditor Gen., to Robert A. Young, Assistant Director of Bureau of School Audits,
July 1975, re PSEA v. Baldwin Whitehall School Dist., 1236 C.D. 1976 (Pa. Com-
monwealth Ct., July 3, 1976).
128. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1154(a) (Supp. 1976).
129. Legal memorandum from Craig R. Burgraff, Deputy Counsel, Office of the
Auditor Gen., to Robert A. Young, Assistant Director Bureau of School Audits, July
1975. Contra, Maywood Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. Maywood Bd. of Educ., 131 N.J. Super.
551, 330 A.2d 636 (1974); Teachers' Ass'n Central High School Dist., No. 3. v.
Board of Educ., 34 A.D.2d 351, 312 N.Y.S.2d 252 (1970); Providence Teachers
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A similar strict construction of a school board's power was
employed in Cumberland Valley Education Association v. Cumber-
land Valley School District.'3" In that case the common pleas court
of Cumberland County ruled that a school district's agreement to pay
more than half-salary to employees on sabbatical leave was invalid. 131
The court made the following observations about the language of
section 1169 of the School Code,13 2 which provides for compensation
during sabbatical leave:
Throughout the sections of the Public School Code of 1949
relevant to sabbatical leave, school boards are advised of those
areas wherein they may stray from the stated provisions. Even
in the act of which the current § 1169 is a part, the legislature
saw fit to include language granting school boards further discre-
tionary power to extend sabbatical leaves. Such language is
conspicuously absent from the provision in question.'
33
This court refused to hold that by granting limited discretion to
school boards in the area of sabbatical leave, the legislature intended
to bestow general discretionary powers. Instead, the court adopted
the construction that when the legislature specifically authorizes an
exercise of discretion, it intends to limit discretion to those explicitly
stated areas.
Ironically, strict statutory construction limiting school boards'
discretionary authority also restricts the scope of bargaining and
preserves the boards' managerial powers. Restricting the areas in
which teachers' associations can exert their statutorily enforceable
trade-off power increases school boards' ability to act unilaterally.
Nevertheless, determination of the extent of a school board's discre-
tionary authority is often circumvented by focusing upon the fourth
principle advanced in the State College decision.
4. Requirement of an Explicit and Definitive Prohibition.-
Following the case law of three other states,'34 the Supreme Court of
Union, Loc. 958 v. School Committee, 108 R.I. 444, 276 A.2d 762 (1971); informal
Attorney General's Opinion from Warren G. Morgan, Deputy Attorney General, to
David H. Kurtzman, Superintendent of Public Instruction, July 12, 1968.
130. 25 Cumb. 203 (Pa. C.P. 1975), aff'd, - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 354
A.2d 736 (1976).
131. Id.
132. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1169 (Supp. 1976): "The person on leave of
absence shall receive one-half of his or her regular salary during the period he or she
is on sabbatical leave." Id.
133. Cumberland Valley Educ. Ass'n v. Cumberland Valley School Dist., 25
Cumb. 203 (Pa. C.P. 1975).
134. Board of Educ. v. Englewood Teachers Ass'n, 64 N.J. 1, 311 A.2d 729
(1973); Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 122,
Pennsylvania stated in PLRB v. State College Area School District'
that section 703 merely invalidates those terms of a collective bargain-
ing agreement that violate existing law.'3 6 A violation will be found
only when the public employer is specifically and definitively prohib-
ited by statute from entering into a particular agreement 3 7 or if a
statute delegates exclusive responsibility to the employer." 8
The school board has the burden of proving that a statutory
provision prohibits collective bargaining on the subject in question.
The difficulty of meeting this burden is illustrated by Board of
Education v. Local 3, Philadelphia Federation of Teachers.19 The
supreme court rejected the school board's contention that it had
exclusive authority to dismiss employees.' 40 In support of its conten-
tion the school board cited section 514 of the School Code,14 ' which
provides that school directors have the right to remove any of their
employees at any time for incompetence, intemperance, neglect of
duty, violation of state school laws, and other improper conduct.
42
Despite this seemingly broad grant of power, the court refused to
acknowledge the board's exclusive authority for two reasons. First,
the supreme court reasoned that the legislature's enumeration of spe-
cific grounds for dismissal indicated an intent to limit the board's dis-
cretion, 143 which would be antithetical to exclusive control. Second,
the school board's decisions are subject to judicial review under the
Local Agency Law14 4 and consequently the board does not have ex-
clusive control of dismissing a nontenured teacher.
145
In Milberry v. Board of Education'4 6 the supreme court used
another rationale to strike down the board's claim of exclusivity. The
court held that the Public School Code does not mandate that the
review of an unsatisfactory rating be conducted by the board alone
because it does not specifically cover the procedures by which a rating
331 N.Y.S.2d 17, 282 N.E.2d 109 (1972); Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin
Employment Rel. Bd., 37 Wis. 2d 483, 155 N.W.2d 78 (1967).
135. 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262.
136. PLRB v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, -, 337 A.2d 262,
269 (1975).
137. Id. at 510, 337 A.2d at 270.
138. Id. at 510, 337 A.2d at 269.
139. - Pa. -, 346 A.2d 35 (1975).
140. Board of Educ. v. Local 3, Phila. Fed'n of Teachers, - Pa. -, -, 346
A.2d 35, 37 (1975).
141. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5-514 (Supp. 1976).
142. The school board also relied on its authority to adopt and enforce rules and
regulations regarding the management of school affairs and the conduct of teachers
under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5-510 (Supp. 1976).
143. Board of Educ. v. Local 3, Phila. Fed'n of Teachers, - Pa. -, -, 346
A.2d 35, 41 (1975).
144. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 11301-311 (Supp. 1976).
145. Board of Educ. v. Local 3, Phila. Fed'n of Teachers, - Pa. , , , n.17
-, 346 A.2d 35, 41, 43 n.17 (1975).
146. - Pa. -, 354 A.2d 559 (1976).
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can be reviewed. 4 7 Therefore, the Code's silence on the reviewabili-
ty of a board decision undermines any claim of exclusivity.
Reviewing the judicial and PLRB decisions interpreting the
interrelationships of sections 701, 702, and 703 reveals a clear trend
to hold that Act 195 mandates bargaining on an ever-increasing
variety of issues. The only limitation placed upon collective bargain-
ing results from a strict construction of the discretionary powers
granted school boards under the School Code. This revolutionary
change in the management of public schools from the unilateral
decision-making of a school board to the bilateral determination of
educational policy through collective bargaining is further expanded
to include third parties under section 903 of Act 195.148
III. Arbitration of Grievances
Under section 903 arbitration of disputes arising out of collec-
tive bargaining agreements is mandatory. 49  Grievance procedures,
including binding arbitration as a last resort, are compulsory subjects
of bargaining. 5 '
In educational disputes three issues consistently arise concerning
the mandates of section 903. The first is whether the dispute in-
volves an improper interpretation of the contract.'5 ' A second issue
is whether the school board had authority to exercise discretion.' 52 A
school board is not bound by agreements that exceeded its authori-
ty.'53 The third and most important consideration is whether the
public employer has exclusive responsibility for making a decision or
whether the duty can be delegated to an arbitrator.'
5 4
147. Id.
148. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Supp. 1976).
149. Cf. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Federal policy
merely favors the submission of disputes to arbitration, it does not require it.
150. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Supp. 1976).
151. If an arbitrator's authority to make a binding decision is, in fact, limited to
contract interpretation, then there is no abdication of policy-making authority on part
of the public employer. Comment, Legality and Propriety of Agreements to Arbi-
trate Major and Minor Disputes in Public Employment, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 129, 313
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Legality]. See, e.g., Belanger v. Matteson, - R.I. -, 346
A.2d 124 (1975); Danville Bd. of School Directors v. Fifield, 132 Vt. 271, 315 A.2d
473 (1974).
152. See notes 5-6 and accompanying text supra.
153. See notes 119-33 and accompanying text supra.
154. WErrzmAN, supra note 26, at 3-15.
The issue of delegability of decision-making was addressed in
Board of Education v. Local 3, Philadelphia Federation of
Teachers.'55 In that case the supreme court held that the school
board's responsibility to determine finally the dismissal of a nonten-
ured teacher can be delegated to an arbitrator.' 56 More generally,
the case stands for the proposition that a decision that the school
board is not exclusively authorized to make can be reviewed by an
arbitrator. The court's declaration that review by an arbitrator does
not impinge upon a school board's power' 57 indicates how pervasive
an arbitrator's influence can become.
In examining section 514 of the School Code, 58 the supreme
court determined that a school board's right to dismiss a teacher is not
affected by a review of the decision by an arbitrator. 5 9 The courv
cited as authority for its decision Danville Board of School Directors
v. Fifield,160 in which the Supreme Court of Vermont distinguished a
school board's right to hire and dismiss employees from the question
of whether a dismissal grievance can be submitted to binding arbitra-
tion.' The Danville court pointed out that the school board has
already exercised its right to dismiss a teacher before the grievance
procedure is set in motion.' 62 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
echoed this idea in concluding that the board's right to dismiss simply
allows it to make the initial determination. 63 The court also noted
that an arbitrator's decision is nothing more than a review of the
fairness of a school board's actions.' The arbitrator's impartial
decision does not limit a school board's power to exercise its discre-
tion unfettered by any consideration except fairness' 65 and, therefore,
155. - Pa. -, 346 A.2d 35 (1975).
156. Id.
157. Id. at - n.17, 346 A.2d at 42-43 n.17.
158. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5-514 (1962).
159. Board of Educ. v. Local 3, Phila. Fed'n of Teachers, - Pa. -, - n.17,
346 A.2d 35, 42 n.17 (1975).
160. 132 Vt. 271, 315 A.2d 473 (1974).
161. Id. at 276, 315 A.2d at 475.
162. Id.
163. Board of Educ. v. Local 3, Phila. Fed'n of Teachers, - Pa. , n.17,
346 A.2d 35, 42-43 n.17 (1975).
164. Id.
165. Cf. H.B. 770, 1975 Sess. § 5139(f) 7(h)(1):
(f) Hearing board or examiner.-Unless otherwise negotiated by the gov-
erning board and the collective bargaining agent of the professional em-
ployee, the hearing shall be held before the governing board or a committee
thereof or, if either the governing board or the professional employee so
requests, before an impartial hearing examiner chosen from a list provided
by the department in accordance with procedures established by the depart-
ment in consultation with representatives of the governing boards and pro-
fessional employees.
(h) Vote required for decision.-
(1) No tenured professional employee shall be dismissed, demoted, or
suspended without pay for disciplinary reasons except after the governing
board has given full, impartial and unbiased consideration of the evidence
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
does not theoretically interfere with the board's authority to dismiss a
teacher. The supreme court further buttressed its conclusion by
stating that binding arbitration does not substitute an arbitrator's
decision for the school board's judgment any more than would the
decision of a court to which a teacher appealed under the Local
Agency Law.166 The court believed that the general assembly wished
to limit the sovereignty of school boards when it granted courts the
right to review school board determinations.' 67 The grant of bind-
ing authority to arbitrators is consistent with this statutory interpreta-
tion.
1 68
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Milberry v. Board of
Education'69 reiterated the logic of Philadelphia Federation of Teach-
ers to validate a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that
provided for arbitration of unsatisfactory teacher ratings. The court
determined that a school board's obligation to evaluate a teacher in
conformance with section 1123 of the School Code 70 is not affected
by an arbitrator's review of that rating. Again, the court relied upon
the reasoning that an arbitrator's decision is nothing more than a
review of the fairness of the rating; therefore, the school board is
unrestricted except by principles of fairness.' 7' Furthermore, the
court concluded that an arbitrator's review of a rating does not affect
the school board's authority to dismiss a teacher because its sole effect
is to provide the teacher with further procedural protection-the right
to an impartial determination of an important evidentiary matter.
1 72
In addition to finding arbitration of grievances consistent with
the School Code, the supreme court held that the procedure was in
accord with public policy.' 73 The court pointed out that the mandate
presented at the hearing and has, by a two-thirds vote of the legally quali-
fied members thereof to be recorded by roll call, determined that the action
is proper and supported by a preponderance of the evidence. If the mem-
bers of the governing board are unable to reach agreement by two-thirds
vote, the professional employee shall be retained and the proposed action
dismissed.
In the proposed School Code the school board retains the right to make the final
determination of dismissal.
166. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 11301-311 (Supp. 1962).
167. Board of Educ. v. Local 3, Phila. Fed'n of Teachers, - Pa. , n.17,
346 A.2d 35, 43 n.17 (1975).
168. Id. at -, 346 A.2d at 38-39 n.6.
169. - Pa. -, 354 A.2d 559 (1976).
170. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1123 (Supp. 1976).
171. Milberry v. Board of Education, - Pa. -, 354 A.2d 559 (1976).
172. Id.
173. Board of Education v. Local 3, Phila. Fed'n of Teachers, - Pa. -, -, 346
A.2d 35, 39 (1975).
to bargain collectively concerning certain matters becomes meaning-
less unless there is a mechanism for resolving disputes. 174  As a
dispute settlement mechanism, arbitration is preferable to costly and
disruptive strikes.' 75 The court also noted that a legal proceeding at
which an impartial judge presides conforms more closely to due
process requirements than a statutory procedure that delegates to a
school board the dual role of prosecutor and judge.17  The major
impact of the supreme court's holding on arbitration fell upon the
Teacher Tenure Act. 177 Although appellant in Philadelphia Federa-
tion of Teachers was a nontenured teacher, the legal and policy
arguments the court advanced apply equally to the dismissal of a
tenured teacher for just cause. Since two of the cases upon which the
court relied involved tenured teachers, 178 it appears that a teacher,
tenured or nontenured, can elect a hearing before an arbitrator rather
than the school board179  Still undecided is whether election of
impartial arbitration precludes a tenured teacher from appealing to
the Secretary of Education and commonwealth court under sections
1131180 and 1132.181
IV. Current Management Powers of School Boards
A. Power to Make Rules and Regulations
Subject to explicit provisions prohibiting bargaining, a school
board's adoption of rules and regulations is now subject to collective
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the commonwealth court have
both addressed themselves to the due process problem involved when an attorney who
advises a government agency also prosecutes a case before that agency. In
instances when there is the appearance of possible prejudice, be it from the govern-
ment body's members or from those who advise it, the courts have found a denial of
due process. Horn v. Township of Hilltown, 461 Pa. 745, 337 A.2d 858 (1975);
Pennsylvania Human Relation Comm'n v. Feeser, 20 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 406,
341 A.2d 584 (1975); Appeal of Feldman, 21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 451, 346 A.2d
895 (1975).
177. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 11-1121-32 (1962 & Supp. 1976).
178. Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 122,
331 N.Y.S.2d 17, 282 N.E.2d 109 (1972); Danville Bd. of School Directors v. Fifield,
132 Vt. 271, 315 A.2d 473 (1974).
179. The procedures for a hearing dismissing a tenured teacher are more detailed
and offer greater procedural safeguards than a hearing under section 514 of the
School Code. The conclusion that a school board is not illegally delegating its
authority by submitting a dismissal to binding arbitration applies equally, however, to
the dismissal of a tenured teacher.
180. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1131 (1962).
181. Id. § 11-1132. The supreme court said, "There is no occasion in this case
to consider the nature and scope of judicial review of the arbitrator's award." Board




bargaining. Sections 510182 and 511183 of the School Code authorize
the board to adopt and enforce rules governing the management of
school affairs, the conduct and deportment of employees and stu-
dents, and the management, supervision, and control of extracurricu-
lar activities.1 4 If a rule deals with subjects, such as teacher conduct
or student discipline, that affect conditions of employment more than
educational policy,' 85 the school board is required to submit it to
bargaining. If, on the other hand, the major impact of the rule's
adoption is on educational policy, the teachers' representative can
trade off a mandatory bargaining item for concessions on a rule in
which the teachers have special interest.188 Bargaining will not be
prohibited under section 703 solely because the board is permitted to
exercise its discretion in adopting rules; the adoption of rules is not
exclusively within the province of the school board. 8 7 Consequent-
ly, Pennsylvania professional employees now appear to have the
power to influence educational policy decisions by participating in
the making of the rules that govern daily operation of their schools.
B. The Significance of Boards' Discretionary Authority
Section 508 of the School Code 8 1 sets forth the subjects upon
which a school board must take a majority vote to act. One of those
subjects is dismissal of a nontenured teacher. If, the majority vote
can be merely a perfunctory ratification of an arbitrator's decision
rather than an exercise of each member's independent judgment,
decisions on subjects listed in section 508 can be made as a result of
bargaining or arbitration without violating section 703 of Act 195.189
Therefore, the board's mandated responsibility to make certain deci-
sions affecting educational policy can be reduced to a ministerial duty
as a result of collective bargaining.
If the statutory provisions fixing compensation or fringe benefits
for teachers also grants discretion to school boards, the board can
182. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5-514 (Supp. 1976).
183. Id. § 5-511.
184. This is an area in which the State Board of Education and the school board
have concurrent jurisdiction. See note 3 and accompanying text supra. Consequently,
no exclusive control argument can be advanced.
185. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
186. See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
187. See notes 119, 189 and accompanying text supra.
188. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 508 (Supp. 1976).
189. Board of 'Education v. Local 3, Phila. Fed'n of Teachers, - Pa. -, -, 346
A.2d 35, 47 (1975) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
exceed the minimum requirements in arriving at a collective bargain-
ing agreement. 190 Determination of salaries and increments under
sections 1142 and 1152 must be effected through bilateral negotia-
tion.19" ' Whether sick leave and sabbatical leave benefits are held
subject to collective bargaining depends upon the particular court's
construction of the School Code.
V. Conclusion
Act 195 and the decisions interpreting it have altered dramati-
cally the power structure within public education. Prior to Act 195
school boards had the power to make unilateral decisions concerning
the management of education in their school districts. Now, how-
ever, they must share that authority with teachers and arbitrators. The
legislature should review the changes in educational policy that have
resulted from bilateral decision-making to determine whether the best
interests of quality education are being served. If not, the legislature
has the responsibility'9 2 to enact remedial legislation.
Because the courts have not uniformly determined the interrela-
tion between Act 195 and the School Code, 19 3 the general assembly
must focus upon those sections of the School Code that have been
affected by Act 195, explicitly identifying the subjects that are not
bargainable.19 4  With the court-developed tests in mind, the legisla-
ture should state clearly what duties of the school board are nondeleg-
able, which provisions prescribe minimum duties, and whether deci-
sions of the school board are ministerial or discretionary.
Since the legislature through collective bargaining has provided
teachers with an effective method of influencing school management,
the legislature should evaluate its effect on the access and power of
interest groups within the community.'95 Any study also must con-
sider whether third-party arbitrators are adequately weighing the
190. See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
191. PLRB v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 508, 337 A.2d 262,
269 (1975) (dictum).
192. NEW JERSEY COMM'N, supra note 26, at 47 citing Charles Rehmus, 'The
Scope of Bargaining in Michigan," delivered at Temple University, Sept. 5, 1975
(unpublished manuscript):
Rehmus contends that the inclusion or exclusion of particular subjects of
negotiation has important social policy implications and, therefore, scope
should be guided by legislative enactment and not be relegated to bargaining
between the parties.
193. The commonwealth court narrowly interprets Act 195 while the supreme
court and PLRB interpret 195 so as to expand the scope of bargaining.
194. This is necessary because the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania will prohibit
bargaining on only those laws that "definitely and explicitly" prohibit bargaining.
PLRB v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 510, 337 A.2d 262, 270
(1975).
195. Wellington & Winter, supra note 26, at 856-59.
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community's interests in reaching their decisions, 1 6 as well as wheth-
er teachers' interests in educational policy matters parallel the public
interest.1"7 Finally, the legislature should evaluate how the restric-
tion and, in some cases, elimination of the boards' discretion has
influenced school board priorities and decisions. If the interests of
the public are found to be inadequately protected under the present
system, the legislature should consider granting power to influence
decisions to interest groups within the community, including the
student-consumer.19 8
It has become necessary for the legislature to determine whether,
in the name of improving employer-employee relations, "efficient and
thorough"' 19 9 education in Pennsylvania has been hindered by Act
195. Furthermore, the legislature must decide whether the public
interest is served by the School Code's indirect revision through
collective bargaining and judicial interpretations of collective bargain-
ing agreements.
DONNA S. WELDON
196. Compare Wellington & Winter, supra note 26, at 86:
[I]n a system where sophisticated impasse procedures involving third par-
ties substantially reduce work stoppages, third party intervention must be
partly responsive to union demands. If the scope of bargaining is open-
ended, the neutral to be effective, will have to work out accommodations
which inevitably advance some of the union's claims some of the time.
And the neutral, with his eyes fixed on achieving a settlement, can hardly
be concerned with balancing all the items on the community agenda or re-
flecting the interests of all relevant groups.
with Legality, supra note 151, at 141, "Experience demonstrates that the arbitrator is
not likely to subordinate public interest."
197. Wellington & Winter, supra note 26, at 852-55; Wollett, supra note 29, at
1029: "Excellence in teacher performance may be discouraged-individual efforts
that transcend established norms or deviate from standardized practice-will be dis-
couraged or repressed in favor of uniformity of performance and equality of compen-
sation."
198. There are two possible alternatives: (1) the community should have a
duly elected group with the power to intervene as a matter of right, or (2) upon the
petition of a certain number of citizens, there would be a referendum over a particular
item in the contract. Wellington & Winter, supra note 26, at 869-70.
199. PA. CONST. art. III, § 14.
